Lying and Poetry from Homer to Pindar《review-morgan》

Morgan 'Lying and Poetry from Homer to Pindar. Falsehood and Deception in Archaic Greek Poetics' Bryn Mawr Classical Review 9411

URL = http://hegel.lib.ncsu.edu/stacks/serials/bmcr/bmcr-9411-morgan-lying

@@@@94.1.4 Pratt Lying and Poetry

Louise H. Pratt Lying and Poetry from Homer to Pindar.

Falsehood and Deception in Archaic Greek Poetics. Ann Arbor:

The University of Michigan Press 1993. Pp. viii 180. $34.50

cloth. ISBN 0-472-10417-9.

The topic of truth and falsehood in the ancient world has

always attracted attention especially recently. Louise Pratt's

book appeared in the same year as Lies and Fiction in the

Ancient World the collected papers from a University of

Exeter colloquium that she acknowledges but was not able to

cite.［1］ The last 30 years have seen classical scholars move

from conceiving the archaic Greek poet as a "master of truth" to

speculating whether it may not be more accurate to picture him as

a master of fiction. P.'s study examines whether poets in the

8th-5th centuries share Nabokov's perception that the liar and

the poet have an innate affinity. Her answer to this question is

yes: the ***ogy between poets and trickster figures suggests

that lying as an expression of imaginative power and

inventiveness might serve as an early model of fiction. P.

hopes to "establish that the way reflection on truth and lies is

formulated in archaic poetry leaves room for archaic appreciation

of fictional narrative" (p. 7). The larger portion of the book

deals with the evidence from Homer Hesiod and the Homeric

Hymns but there are also smaller forays in epinician "truth" and

various critiques of poetic deception from the presocratics down

to Plato.

An introduction sketches her thesis and briefly summarizes the

upcoming chapters. Chapter 1 "Aletheia and Poetry:

Iliad 2.484-87 and Odyssey 8.487-91 as Models of

Archaic Narrative" has a defensive purpose: to assert that the

evidence for an archaic connection between poetry and truth is

not as strong as has been assumed. P. examines two passages that

seem to suggest a commitment to truth on the part of the archaic

narrator. The invocation to the Muses in Iliad 2 and

Odysseus' compliment to Demodocus in Odyssey 8 are often

taken to imply that the Muses dispense inaccessible knowledge and

that the aim of the poet is to present an accurate account of the

past. P. disputes the conclusion that aletheia must mean

memory associating lethe instead with an absence of

awareness. P. defines aletheia as "an absence of

hiddeness that might give rise to a failure of perception or

awareness . . . [It] excludes not only forgetfulness but also

invention falsehood fiction intentional omission insincerity

equivocation--anything that might prevent the hearer's perceiving

accurately the subject matter under discussion" (20-21).

How then should we read the invocations to the Muses in the

epics? Do their demands for accuracy and truth in particular

instances affect the truth-status of the narrative as a whole?

P. finds demands for universal accuracy difficult to reconcile

with the archaic awareness of competing versions of myth. She

examines the numerous passages in archaic poetry that suggest

that song was valued for the pleasure it created. Strict

aletheia would not therefore be preeminent in archaic

poetics; the archaic emphasis on pleasure and certain affinities

between poet and liar suggest that epic narrative has an

uncertain truth value. If epic narrative preserves information

about the past this does not entail that the entire narrative is

a non-fictional representation of that past. Since fiction

"marries the real and the imaginary" and exists in an uncertain

relationship with "truth" P. concludes that "Homeric narrative

is essentially a fictional variety of discourse" (p. 37).

I have some reservations about the exclusivity of P.'s

definition of aletheia. She needs this exclusivity in

order to prove that a pseudos may be a tool for the

revelation of a more broadly-based ethical truth. While I would

accept that aletheia implies an absence of hiddeness I am

not sure that this entails a moratorium on invention. This is

of course the point at issue throughout the whole book. If

invention is positively viewed and if it must be categorized as

falsehood then falsehood may be positively viewed. This

argument is suggestive but may not be valid. First one misses

any indisputable evidence that aletheia does not allow for

the representation of "truth" through invented elements. Second

as a colleague has remarked to me a speech act may be approved

under one description but not under another. I may approve of

Odysseus' lying tales qua inventions but not qua

falsehoods. The question of overlap between the concepts of

invention fiction and falsehood is a troublesome one. Another

area of possible disagreement is the concept of "fiction." P.

assumes that an awareness of invention is tantamount to

recognizing the category of fiction (p. 23-24). Yet his

assumption is not self-evident. C. Gill has remarked that there

is a difference between saying that fiction is a universal human

practice and that "'fiction' signifies a determinate practice . .

. performed in some societies under some explicit or implicit

description which we can recognize as being that of

'fiction'."［2］ Poetry may be characterized by "a hierarchy of

values that leaves room for fictional representation" (p. 32)

but the very weakness of this formulation suggests how

problematic it is to claim that Homeric narrative is

essentially fictional and that the Greeks saw it as such.

Admiration of invention may be consistent with modern notions of

fiction but it does not mandate an awareness of the category.

In P.'s eyes fictional and truthful (but not alethic)

speech overlap: nonfiction seen as ***ogous to Homeric

aletheia is an exclusive category. Homeric narrative is

thus fictional and truthful but not alethic. One wonders

however whether the early Greeks would have recognized a

technical notion of aletheia as nonfiction. Those who

think that the rise of the first philosophers marks a fundamental

reconception of early Greek notions of truth falsehood and

validity (among whom I include myself) may be reluctant to think

so. Not all readers then will accept the definitions of the

first chapter. Yet despite the difficulties of applying modern

conceptions of fictionality it is useful to bring them into

play. Moreover P.'s discussion of aletheia marks an

important advance over the framework of Detienne and his

followers. Her criticism of Detienne's model of truth as

unforgetfulness is penetrating and pinpoints difficulties that

are too often ignored.

Chapter 2 "Odysseus and Other Tricksters: Lying Kata

Kosmon" deals with the positive associations of lying. Both

the Odyssey and the Hymn to Hermes suggest

affinities between poets and the tricksters Odysseus and Hermes.

The attention thus thrown on the possibility of poetic deception

is taken by P. to affirm the fictionality of poetry. Ethical

norms are thrown into confusion: aesthetics are valued more than

strict truth and P. interprets this alternate hierarchy of

values as offering "a certain justification of fiction" (p. 55).

P. lists four principles that interfere with the assumption that

telling the truth is good and lying is bad. 1) Taking advantage

of and deceiving one's enemies is good. 2) Not everyone

deserves to hear the truth. 3) Some falsehoods may be the

vehicles of truth. (This principle seems to me to be less

self-evident from the texts themselves.) 4) The truth is not

always pleasant and must sometimes be hidden.

Having established these principles P. moves on to Odysseus'

association with the Homeric bard. Lying and fictionalizing are

similar and Homer justifies his own use of fiction by creating

Odysseus as an acceptable model of a liar. The lies and

deceptions of Hermes in the Homeric Hymn are also

associated with poetry. The bard is a practitioner of a

techne; consciousness of this calls attention to poetic

inventiveness. That archaic poetry values thelxis

(enchantment) and apate (deception) does not prove the

poets saw their work as fictional but P. finds it difficult to

reconcile with strict aletheia. Moreover she points out

enchantment the engagement of imaginative rather than critical

faculties is seen as the hallmark of fictional narration in

modern discussions. P. suggests that the poet's ability to speak

in many voices also associates him with the liar; archaic poets

must therefore differentiate between good and bad uses of their

skills. Here again Odysseus is a model. Like good poetic

fiction his lies do not harm his philoi and are

appropriate and pleasurable. Lies are acceptable when they

preserve ethical truth and promote cultural values; they are

then pseudea etumoisin homoia (lies like truths).

The possibility of affinities between trickster figures such

as Odysseus and archaic poets is intriguing. One might however

argue the extent to which a potential affinity suggests that

Odysseus may be a model for the poet.［3］ The

differences of situation between Odysseus and a bard are as

striking as the similarities. Odysseus is in a situation where

his life is at risk. His lies are (almost) always motivated and

serve a purpose that is not always an ethical one except insofar

as he is justified in attempting to complete a successful

homecoming. A bard by contrast is more detached and has other

motivations. Odysseus' falsehoods have a pragmatic base and

this is underlined by his association with Athena whom we might

on P.'s paradigm identify as his Muse. Yet such a formulation

shows us the limitations of the ***ogy between Odysseus and the

poet. Even if poets share some techniques with Odysseus and

Athena she is not a Muse and he is not a poet. P.'s ***ogy

paints the background against which we must evaluate the poet's

task: the Odyssean paradigm is a possibility for the bard but

probably one he must deny (just as Phemius must deny political

involvement in Odyssey 23).

Chapter 3 is entitled "Other Models of Archaic Narrative and

Poetic Truth: Hesiod's Etetuma Lies Like Truths and

Other Aenigmata" and examines Hesiod's commitment to

truth. The Works and Days claims to offer valid advice

not the accurate account of a reliable eyewitness. Hesiod's use

of fable and his presentation of two alternate explanations for

mankind's life of toil (both of which cannot be literally

true) suggest that narrative's paradigmatic function is more

important than its literal truth. The presence of similar

paradigmatic stories in the Iliad and Odyssey

indicates that epic narrative may have lost its non-fictional and

commemorative function and come to a fictional and paradigmatic

one. We may characterize this model for poetic "truth" by the

adjective etetumos (rather than alethes).

Etetumos describes a correspondence between words and

reality. It may thus allow for a more metaphorical form of

expression since it describes words which are valid even if not

"alethic." Etetumos may be used to characterize various

forms of enigmatic speech and may also be applied to poetic

wisdom. While it may be inappropriate therefore to

characterize poetry as alethes it is acceptable to call

it etetumos (valid and meaningful).

P. takes a similar approach to the problematic statements of

the Muses at Theog. 22-35. She disputes the usual

assumption that the "lies like true things" in line 27 are

negative. If all Hesiod's stories about Pandora and the Myth of

the Races are true this implies an extended notion of truth but

one then wonders precisely what pseudea would be. P.'s

solution is that the Muses offer a riddling description of

poetry: the best artist will mix the truth with plausible

fictions and we will therefore never be able to tell when the

Muses are speaking alethea and when they are speaking

pseudea.

One of the great merits of this chapter is that it compels one

to reconsider the nature of the relationship between alethea

etetuma and pseudea and possibly to reconceive the

thrust of the Theogony proem. P.'s interpretation is

challenging and subtly argued; I offer some of my discomforts

here in the spirit of continuing the discussion. Earlier

chapters imply that anything which is not alethes is

pseudes. Anything that is alethes is also

etetumos but the reverse is not true (p. 101). It

follows then that anything etetumos but not

alethes is pseudes. This is an uncomfortable

formulation however; would an archaic Greek have accepted that a

falsehood could be etumos/valid? If we replace the word

"falsehood" with the word "fiction" the proposition becomes

easier and we can arrive at P.'s "fictional truth" (p. 103).

Yet where does this leave us with regard to Theog. 27?

Hesiod does not speak of falsehoods that are valid but of

falsehoods which are like valid things but which are not

presumably identical with them. P.'s answer I think is that

the Muses' formulation is consciously riddling and paradoxical

(p. 110) and implies that a good poet confounds truth (and here I

take her to be referring to alethic truth) and fiction but her

translation of the phrase ("lies like true things") is

inconsistent with her own conclusions about the adjective

etetumos. On P.'s reading pseudea etumoisin

homoia should juxtapose not truth and fiction but fiction

and validity. If there is no problem with "fiction" being

"valid" where is the paradox? P. is probably right to say that

Hesiod makes no claim to nonfictionality but this may be because

he has no developed notion of fiction to begin with.

In chapter 4 P. considers truth and lies in epinician poetry.

Both Pindar and Bacchylides make claims to truth but they

restrict these claims to the validity of their poetry and do not

imply that fictional elements should not enter their mythological

narrative. Aletheia in epinician is the correct

apportionment of praise; pseudea are the improper

attribution of blame. Yet neither blame nor lies are rejected

outright; they are what one does to one's enemies. Pindar thus

creates categories of truth and lying appropriate to his genre.

He never claims aletheia for his mythological narratives

merely appropriateness. The rhetorical strategy of O. 1

where Pindar rejects the cannibalistic banquet of the gods

implies that even the "truthful" poet of praise will

fictionalize.

This treatment of epinician "truth" is on the whole thorough

and convincing. Yet again the introduction of the concept of

fiction is troubling. P. states that the assertions of truth and

the rejections of lies should not be taken to imply the rejection

of fictional elements in the myths (p. 115) and that the

epinician poet's explicit responsibility to truth tells us little

about his appreciation of fictional narrative (p. 119). It is

worth noting that P. formulates these assertions negatively

rather than positively: the rhetorical strategy of O. 1

implies that a poet may fictionalize; assertions of truth

should not be taken to imply the rejection of fiction; the

responsibility to truth tells us little about any

appreciation for fiction. This may be so. But nowhere do Pindar

or Bacchylides say that they fictionalize. This is not the same

as saying that they do not fictionalize (from our point of view);

rather it is to say that they do not formulate and perhaps do

not recognize the category. Even if Pindar invents his version

of the Pelops myth out of whole cloth we may still question

whether he would see that invention as a fiction. Archaic

Greek poetic practice is compatible with our notion of fiction

but this may be the most that we can say.

The final chapter "Lying Not Well: Other Critiques of the

Tradition" surveys archaic and classical critiques of poetry

that seem to demand truthful representation and that might

therefore seem to imply that archaic culture had no appreciation

for fictionality. P. examines some representative authors:

Stesichorus Xenophanes early allegorists Heraclitus

Herodotus Thucydides and Plato and concludes that none of

their critiques excludes a recognition of poetic fiction.

Rather they are directed against specific and inappropriate

poetic texts. Stesichorus' Palinode thus competes with

Homer's version of the story of Helen in the realm of

appropriateness not that of truth. Xenophanes does not reject

poetic tales about the gods because they are fictional but

because they are ethically harmful. The practice of the early

allegorists also suggests that poetry was thought to function on

an ethical level. P. suggests that Herodotus and Thucydides see

traditional narrative as fiction. Both are sceptical about the

truth status of Homer and recognize that the principles that

govern poetry may be different from their own. Finally P.

examines Plato's attack on the poets in the Republic and

uses it as a confirmation of the trends she sees in many of the

previous critiques. Plato is more interested in the effects of

poetry on character than in its historical truth. The Platonic

dialogues are Plato's own attempt to create acceptable fiction.

The ***ysis P. attempts in this chapter is provocative and

demands further attention than is possible in a review of this

scope. The range of authors covered entails that P.'s

examination must be cursory as she herself realizes (p. 132).

What then are the achievements of this book? P.'s ***ysis

is valuable in its refusal to oversimplify complex issues. P.

writes clearly organizes her arguments well and deals at length

with competing approaches to the topic of truth in archaic

literature. One may suspect that modern conceptions of fiction

are misapplied to archaic poetry but this does not alter the

fact that examining archaic poetics from this angle generates a

fruitful meditation on assumptions we have taken for granted. P.

proves to my satisfaction (and relief) that it is reductive and

uninformative to conceive poetic aletheia "as a kind of

'unforgetfulness' distinct from modern notions of truth" (p.

103). She proves that there is a potential (but not I think an

innate) affinity between the poet and liar or trickster figures.

She raises telling doubts about the extent to which we should

read Homeric requests for accurate information from the Muses as

a program for epic narrative. My disagreement with some of P.'s

contentions might lead a reader to believe that I am dubious

about the value of this book. On the contrary my disagreements

are an index of the excitement it generates.

Kathryn Morgan

Ohio State University

NOTES

1. C. Gill and T. P. Wiseman edd. Lies and Fiction in the

Ancient World (Austin 1993).

2. C. Gill "Plato on Falsehood--not Fiction" in Lies and

Fiction in the Ancient World pp. 69-71.

3. Compare the remarks of Gill pp. 70-71.