Hegel《我的论文，很像话的一篇论文……》

假装有好几个参考文献，其实主要参考这一本（再加黑格尔自己写的）

History has a crucial role in Hegel’s whole accounts of philosophy. A distinct feature of his philosophy is that it is defined and explained in historical terms (Beiser 1993). Concerning this understanding what history means in Hegel’s sense seems important. Briefly Hegel deems that history is spiritual by nature and its role is a means through which the spirit realizes itself. It is famously stated that “[w]orld history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom” (Hegel 1998: 402). This essay then is an attempt to elaborating what is exactly meant by this. It begins by an explanation of the concept of spirit in Hegel’s terms which is fundamental for the answer. Then the biggest part looks at several key points in explaining the process of spirit to realize itself in other words what “the consciousness of freedom” signifies. Meanwhile relevant concepts in Hegelian philosophy such as dialectics and freedom will be examined which are necessary in understanding Hegel’s theme of history. Finally it will describe Hegel’s ***ysis of the concrete world history which not only illustrates the above assertions but also is the proof from which they are drawn.

Though for Hegel history has the spirit and matter both as its components its substance is ultimately spiritual. For understanding this it should be understood what spirit is about. There are two points first to clarify. On one hand the spirit is consciousness of objects. On the other hand the consciousness of objects includes the consciousness of the spirit itself. In other words the spirit itself is the content of the spirit: it comes to know its consciousness. For this reason the spirit is in itself. It is self-sufficient do not depend on the external; therefore it is free. Matter on the contrary exist for an external point thus is not self sufficient. Indeed matter is resulted as the spirit’s attempt to make an existence (Hegel 1998). Because of this it is spirit that ultimately determines (Beiser 1993).

Since spirit has freedom as its true substance the consciousness of itself means that it comes to know it is free and that its freedom is due to its nature. However it does not occurs from the beginning. It is not conscious of itself at first therefore it does not know that it is free. As long as it does not know it is free it is in slavery. Because only when it is aware of its freedom will it able to enjoy it to actualize it and to make the external world exist for its own ends. The spirit has to undergo such a process to achieve this self-awareness which forms the substance of history (Hegel 1998). That is why Hegel says that history eventually belongs to the realm of spirit and that the course of history is the development of the spirit to be conscious of freedom.

But this development is never straightforward nor in abstract that is why a lengthy and concrete history is there and necessary. Several points are responsible for understanding this. Firstly before the spirit is fully conscious of itself it goes through one after another stage in which error is followed by the negation of it namely the dialectical movement (Singer 2001). Secondly this progress of spirit has to take concrete history as its instrument that is it is realized by bringing its existence into the real world and is achieved under solid historical conditions (Beiser 1993; Sayers 1980). Thirdly and very importantly it is not fulfilled in a single person but is a process taking place in the whole society and involving every equal man (Beiser 1993; Taylor 1975). The above is so because freedom is so crucial a pursuit yet so easy to be mistaken. It is the goal of all human beings not an individual. Therefore it relies on mature institutions to actualize it yet is faced with threatens from every possibilities to undermine it (Hegel 1998). The following of this essay is going to explain those points respectively yet coherently.

First the spirit becomes fully aware of itself through several stages. To illustrate this: after the spirit reaches some form of consciousness it will discover that it is a less genuine knowledge therefore make a negation. This negation however is not the simple cancellation of the first consciousness which ends up with no progress. Instead the reconciliation of the two sides accomplishes a new form of consciousness which is more advanced than the initial one. This process will not reach its end until a full recognition of the spirit itself which is called by Hegel the absolute knowledge. That is all reality it comes to know is known through consciousness therefore the outcome of itself. It is self-sufficient so there is nothing beyond itself no negation could be made to supplement this. In other words the spirit knowing it is the spirit (knowing what the nature of spirit is) is the culmination of history (Singer 2001).

Next the above arguments are not merely in metaphysical terms which could be achieved in vacuum. On the contrary they have to be carried out in terms of empirical deeds (Beiser 1993). According to Hegel (1998) the spirit makes the external world its existence. As it gains certain degrees of knowledge it achieves certain degrees of freedom. This achieved freedom is demonstrated in the autonomy (though still indefinite) of applying the knowledge to transform the real world in a range of aspects. The results are such as arts religion institution and ethical life which embody the temporal level of freedom and compose the concrete world history. And in turn the accomplishments in external form make the condition for further progress of the spirit. For Hegel human beings are not born to be maturely rational but they have the potential which has to be realized under real conditions (Sayers 1980). A case in point is that the spirit of the historian is the result of the spirit of the time he writes about (O’Brien 1985). Indeed Hegel sees his own recognition of spirit’s nature not a mere description of history but the outcome of it and part of it –itself is the final endeavour to the consummation of history (Singer 2001). History is realized through his concrete real act of thinking.

Furthermore the realization of freedom is by no means the freedom of doing whatever in one’s own pursuit (Taylor 1975). Instead it is the freedom of using reason to reconcile between individuals in their pursuits (Plant 1983; Taylor 1975). This is perhaps the reason for the above two characters of history. Individuals’ interests are in conflict so there are constant errors as long as only one side is taken into account; yet this conflict is the force of progression so there are constant corrections (though may be extravagance) to the errors. Therefore the development of consciousness is in context of a transpersonal relation whereby the detailed history comes into existence (Beiser 1993; Sayers 1980). At the beginning a man’s concern of his own determines his action. Extensions of this are such as the love for family and friends. They are all limited forms of spirit far from being the concern of the mankind as a whole. Sacrifices come as costs yet generate the further development of consciousness: the spirit finally recognizes that another object is also a self-consciousness who shares the same needs as the spirit’s own. In this light a higher morality is formed and principles and institutions can be established accordingly. Hegel sees the state the highest existence of the spirit where individuals are aware that it is the best means of the freedom for all and each of them thus enjoys this freedom. It is through this that the end of the history is reached (Hegel 1998).

Having sketched the crucial characters of history an account they give to the concrete world history is needed. Without this the historical emphasis in Hegel’s philosophy would indeed be betrayed. Hegel divides the world history into four stages: the Oriental world the Greek world the Roman world and the German world. Each of them has a different stage of consciousness and particular political institutions (Plant 1983). The Oriental world includes China India and Persia where only one person the despot had some freedom. All the others totally did not nor were them aware of their lack of freedom. However while the governance in China and India was more arbitrary the rule of the Persian emperor was based on an intellectual principle which is the seedbed where the consciousness of freedom could grow. Therefore Hegel excludes China and India from the world history yet counts Persian the beginning of it (Singer 2001).

The Greek world was where the individuals did have actual freedom. It was manifested in their participation in the politics of their city state. However development of the spirit was still halfway at that stage. Because the individuals were not aware of their freedom despite that they actually owned it. Their having freedom was rather due to an external custom than their self-consciousness (Singer 2001; Taylor 1975). Then in the Roman world the progression was that the individual freedom existed in ancient Greece was recognized; yet the regression was that this form of freedom was not actualized by voluntary but by the force of a legal system. Here history started to reveal its contradiction. The birth of Christianity as a solution during that period is therefore appreciated by Hegel. In his view the Christian religion went beyond the physical world and found the spiritual conception of love. Yet before the external world could be transformed to realize this notion the spirit itself drifted way remaining the institution of Church degenerated in the pursuit of material ends. This marked the opening of the German world (Singer 2001).

For a long period known as the Middle Ages this dreadful scene kept enacted. Then came the Reformation. Since it emphasized individual’s own spiritual connection to Christ without the imposing of the Church Hegel sees it as the way to the real self-consciousness based on reason. The Enlightenment following that was then an attempt at establishing all kinds of institutions to guarantee the implement of reason. Though the French Revolution became an failure due to people’s lack of recognition and acceptance of such institutions’ role its general principle was passed down to Hegel’s own times; and he insists that till his time history has fulfilled its purpose (ibid). Though Hegel gives insufficient reason for this and the future of world history still remains as a question his general account to the world history makes sense. It consistently reveals a dialectic relationship between the idea of freedom and the external institution of maintaining (or rather undermining it) through which general progress of the spirit – the awareness of freedom - is realized.

To summarize this essay has elaborate the nature and role of history in Hegel’s sense. It maintains that through recognizing that the spirit is free the freedom of the spirit is really achieved. History then is this process that the spirit carries. It is mentioned in the beginning of this essay that Hegel defines philosophy in term of history. It has been again argued by many authors that he defines history in terms of philosophy that is in terms of thought. For this reason he is accused of excluding deeds which are not in accordance with his account of human thoughts such as the Oriental world out of the concept of history. Therefore his emphasis of the totality is in fact partial (Beiser 1993; O’Brien 1985). Despite this possible flaw however his idea that philosophy and history are inseparable with the interpretation of freedom as its goal has positive significance in political terms which can be read as the call for the actualization of thought in the real world.

References:

Beiser F. C. (1993) ‘Hegel’s Historicism’ in Beiser F. C. (ed.) (1993) The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hegel G. W. F. (1998) ‘Philosophy of History: Introduction’ in Houlgate S. (ed.) (1998) The Hegel Reader. Oxford: Blackewell.

O’Brien G. D. (1985) ‘Does Hegel Have a Philosophy of History?’ in Inwood M. (ed.) (1985) Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Plant R. (1983) Hegel. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sayers S. (1980) ‘Dualism Materialism and Dialectics’ in Norman R. and Sayers S. (1980) Hegel Max Dialectic: A Debate. Brookfield: Gregg Revivals.

Singer P. (2001) Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taylor C. (1975) Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.